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The COlI is a poem of pity • • • the
JlDther to millions of Indian manman
kind. •• CcM protection to me is
one of the JlDst wonderful phenanena
in human evolution. [1]

ritually defiling to do so; whereas lower
caste persons JlDre frequently eat meat, and
sure have as their caste occupations the
tarming and preparation of hides.
Gandhi's
vegetarianism was based on different notions
(non-violence and nutritional, rather than
ritual, purity of the body), and COlI protecprotec
tion was not a necessary correlation to it.
For a time during his wayward youth, Gandhi
was a meat-eater, and later on in life he is
said to have recarrnended eating meat to suresure
one undernourished for lack of protein, desdes
pite the vigorous opposition of sane of the
upper caste residents of his Ashram at the
time. [3]
Garrlhi also favored the expansion
of tarmeries, to utilize the hides of cattle
which had expired through natural deaths.

It is a source of puzzled embarrassment
to many Garrlhian admirers, who otherwise find
in his thoughts a happy marriage of the JlDre
sensible of Hindu concepts and the JlDre propro
gressive of western values, that Gandhi was
not JlDre JTDdest in his affection for the COlI.
Yet, it may also be argued, as I intend to
do, that Gandhi I s bovine peculiarities are
integral, perhaps' seminal, to the whole of
his ethical stance; and that a richer urx:l.erurx:l.er
standing of the Gandhian symrol of the COlI
will lead to a JTDdel of human/animal ethics
which may be useful in the west, where the
present confusion on that issue is despaired
by the supporters of animal liberation and
exacerbated by the sociobiologists.

we

Econanic and Political Reasons
One may argue that instead of sacredotal
and custClTliU}' reasons for venerating the COlI,
Gandhi relies fW1damentally on ethical rearea
sons. Yet, before this argument may be made,
one Trnlst acknowledge that Gandhi also had
rather practical reasons for regarding the
COlI with sane deference.

make no claim that Gandhi's position

is representative of Indian culture, for sane
of the JlDre traditional reasons for veneratvenerat
ing the COlI are absent fran Gandhi's apap
proach.
Despite his enigmatic claim that
"the central fact of Hinduism is COlI protecprotec
tion, "[2] Gandhi's COlI is not an especially
religious beast.
He does not linger over
Krishna's lave for the CCMS, as characterized
in the Haribamsa and the Puranas; nor does
Gandhi utili,ze the Shaivite irragery of the
scholarly and Ferdinand-like bull, Nandi.
When Gandhi speaks of his "worship" of the
COlI,
one should regard this as an alm:>st
metaphorical expression and not expect evievi
dence of the Mahabna saying prayers and perper
forming puja in front of cattle or ritually
garlanding them with flowers.

One of these practical reasons was ecoeco
nanic. The COlI is a useful and vital part of
village econauy, and for Gandhi, COlI protecprotec
tion meant COlI care, the maintenance of catcat
tle as an important econanic unit.
Gandhi
might have vieYJed with sure synq;athy the
efforts of Marvin Harris to make India I s
teeming cattle population appear eCO:lanically
advisable. [4]
And Gandhi might also have
agreed with Alan Heston that the shabby and
ill-tended CCMS are an econanic nuisance. [5]

Gandhi's veneration of the COlI is also
not obviously connected with caste restricrestric
tions on touching defiled arrl polluted matmat
ter, and eating meat. Ordinarily, In India,
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upper caste people do not eat Jreat or use
leather products, in part because it would be
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In general, Gandhi avoided the issue of whewhe
ther the CON p:>p.Uation, as presently utilutil
ized, is econanically advantageous or disaddisad
vantageous.
When Gandhi was presented with
the argument, in 1925, by an English writer,
that surplus CXJWS cost Irrlia almost two bilbil
lion rupees annually, Gandhi admitted that
there might be an overall public cost to CON
protection, but avowed that "a religious
senti.Ioont is not worth the name i f it is not
worth paying for. II [6] Gandhi's solution to
the problem was not to kill off the CXJWS-CXJWS-

the p:>ssibilities of a Hindu-Muslim alliance
in Congress. In the 40's, it was the rise of
Muslim nationalism, leading ~ the creacrea
tion of Pakistan, and its CO\ID.terpart in
militant Hinduism.
In both of these instaninstan
ces, Gandhi's camlE!Ilts about CXJWS were meant
to be words of reconciliation between Hindus
and Muslims.
Gandhi claimed, for instance,
that "it is the Hindus that do OOIo/'""selling
business, and not the Musalmans," and hence
Hindus are really to blame for <::X)W""-slaugh<::X)W""-slaugh
ter. [8] '!be Muslim butcher, Gandhi claimed,
was simply doing his business, and it was up
to the Hindu cattle merchant to make the
profession econanically unfeasible.
Gandhi
was adamantly against the legal ban on CON
slaughter, for"it is obviously wrong legally
to enforce one's religious practices on those
who do not share that religion;"[9] rather,
Gandhi urged an improvement in Hindu-Muslim
relations as the only viable protection of
the CON.
Similar to the econanic issue of
scientific CON treatment, the p:>litical issue
of Muslim attitudes towards CON slaughter was
made plblically palatable by Gandhi through
an appeal to Hindu religious sentiment.
It
was a mark of Gandhi's ethical agility that
he could take a religious notion that usually
implied narr~ess and prejudice, and turn it
into a concept of progress and harIJOny.

which he regarded as being lIOrally rep..1gnant,
i f not impractical--but, rather, to make the
existing CXJWS econanically useful.
In fact,
the bulk. of Gandhi's writings
about the CON are essays on the utility of
rrcdern dairy techniques, and their feasibilifeasibili
ty for Irrlia.
Yet, such essays are couched
in rhetoric about the sanctity of the CON.
"By every act of cruelty to all" cattle, II
Gandhi writes, "we dis~ God and Hinduism••
the miserable condition of our cattle." For
the proper veneration of the sacred beasts,
Gandhi is quick to suggest "rrcdel dairy fanns
and
great profitable
national
institu
institutions."[?]

It is clear that whatever other ethical
and personal reasons Gandhi may have had for
speaking kindly of the CON, it had the pracprac
tical effect of stirring Hindu sympathies
towards scientific dairy techniques.
As he
Md done on many other occasions, Gandhi was
arousing religious passions in a way that
would effect social change, in this case,
econanic change.

Ethical Bases for

'!be econcmic and p:>litical importance of
CON should not,
however, deter us
fran proceeding apace and reaJgIlizing its
ethical symbolism.
There are two levels of
ethical significance:
the obvious linkages,
which Gandhi made explicitly, and those less
obvious ethical inferences which we i.rnpJte to
Gandhi.

Am:mg the obvious ethical elements,

the

=cept of ahimsa, non-violence, loans IIDSt
praninent.
Gandhi OCIlIll){l1y would alternate
paragra:fX1g on CON protection with paragra:fX1g
on the concept of ahimsa, in an alIJOst liturlitur
gical litany. '!bere is ancient precedent for
that connection, for although there does not
appear to be evidence that the concept of CON
protection emerged at the same time in anan
cient India as that of non-violence, the two
concepts certainly appear to develop, butbut
tressed by each other, during the first cencen
turies of the Christian era. According to w.
Norrran Br~, "the idea of Ahimsa and the
doctrine of the sanctity of the CON slowly
gain status together. •• roughly about the

I-bst of Gandhi's wrilings about the CON
were in the early 1920's and in the mid-40's,
two m:::m:mts when Hindu-Muslim relations were
critical.
In the 20's, the issue centered
around. the restoration of the Khilafat and
'!HE SPEX::IES

Protection

Gandhi's

Gandhi's interests in the CON also had
p:>litical significance, especially in the
context of Hindu-Muslim relations.
The MusMus
lims, after all, were the people in India
lIOst liable to slaughter CXJWS for beef and
by-products, and public sentiment anong HinHin
dus for a ban on CON slaughter has always had
a double edge:
the p:>sitive virtues of veve
nerating the CON and the negative aspect of
protecting the CON fran its natural enemy,
the Muslim butcher.
It is when Hindu-Muslim
tensions are at their IJOst taut that the
issue of CON protection is IJOst visible and
lIOst visibly dangerous.
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and many cows.
Gandhi persistently uses the
singular form, as Irrlians frequently do, in
referring to the cow.
And yet, of course,
there are thousands of cows in Irrlia, each of
whan partakes in sore way in a generic sasa
credness.
To harm anyone cow is to lay a
hand on the cosmic Mother.

5th century to the 4th century AD." [10]
What is distinctive about Gandhi's apap
proach is that ahimsa is interpreted rather
broadly, to incorporate the ethical concept
of the unity of all life, and the fX)sitive
injooction to love one's fellow being.
Ac
According to Gandhi, "the cow merely stands as
a symbol, and protection of the cow is the
least [one] is expected to tmdertake." [11]
Reverence towards the cow "takes the human
being beyond his species. •• the cow to lIE
means the entire sub-human world."[12]
For
Gandhi, cow reverence was a way of expanding
one's consciousness, of gaining an identity
with the whole of the created order.

Moreover, not just the cow itself, but
one's relationship to it, is a resolution of
the tension, a holistic act. 'ilie cow, after
all, is a dtnnb animal, a thing which produces
doog and pulls plows; and yet it is imputed
to be also a close relative:
our very
mother.
A thing becanes live, personable, a
related extension of the self.
Gandhi exex
plains this aspect of the cow's symbolic
nature as our link with all species.
It is
that, but it is also our link with all
things, and persons whan we might otherwise
regard as things, by reminding us that even
the dtnnb cow is our symbolic mother.
'ilie
otherness of the exterior world is integrated
with the wholeness of the self.
In Martin
Buber's terms, the "it" hcs becerne a "thou."

That wider identity is allied with the
concept of llRltual love, which also is rere
flected in the symbol of the non-violent cow.
For Gandhi, non-violence means not violating
the integrity of another living being. 'ilius,
Gandhi claimed that, in his opinion, "every
little breach of the ahimsa principle, like
causing hurt by harsh speech to any one, man,
wanan or child, to cause pain to the weakest
and the most insignificant creature on earth,
would be a breach of the principle of cow
protection • • • differing fran it in degree,
if at all, rather than in kind."[B]

'ilie cow is appropriate for this symbol
in p:irt because it has been assigned that
role by being designated the mother cow, the
personable,
self-extended, relative self.
'ilien too, the role of the cow in the Irrlian
village also makes this symbol appropriate,
and vital.
The cow is p:irt of the family
more than any other animal, physically in the
center of things, its various products essenessen
tial to the daily maintenance of the househouse
hold, fran the ghee (clarified butter) used
in cooking, to the dW1g-cakes which are used
for the cooking fires.

Mediation Between the One and the Many
These ethical concepts--ahimsa, respect
for all life, and llRltual love--are approappro
priate to the image of the cow, but they are
sanehow insufficient in explaining the disdis
tinctive p:JWer of the cow as an ethical symsym
bol.
One has the feeling that the gentle
kitten, or the magnanimous water buffalo,
might have done just as well.
For Gandhi to
have written about the cow with such virulent
ethical p:ission, clearly sore other explanaexplana
tions are in order.
For these explanations,
we will look directly at the cow itself, as
Gandhi describes it, rather than relying ufX)n
Gandhi's ethical interpretations.
What we
have foood is that the image of the cow is a
symbolic
JOCdiation between t\\Q different
basic ethical dilemnas.

This image of the cow's role in the
village is especially evocative for Gandhi,
who thought of the Indian village as a parapara
digm for the harmonious corrrnun.ity.
Gandhi
tended to idealize the traditional village,
even though he did not live in any, except
those which he recreated himself.
It was in
the rural p:ice of life, the econanic selfself
sufficiency and direct personal relationrelation
ships, that Gandhi found the closest realizarealiza
tion of the truthful, non-violent social
ideal.
According to Gandhi, urban civilizaciviliza
tion has no hope W1til it is penetrated with
"the values of the rural life."[141 'ilie COli,
then, symbolizes not only the closeness of
village relationships but also the character
of the village itself.

'!he first of those dilemnas is the didi
chotany between the one am the many, the
tension between the ethical primacy of the
integral self and the social whole. How does
the cow resolve this dilemna?
On the simsim
plest level, the cow is a resolution of the
dilemna by being both one and many, the cow

The
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symbol

of the cow is a

symbol

of

psychic unity, a mediation between individuindividu
alism arrl differentiation, between the perils
of selfishness on the one hand, arrl loss of
self on the other.
for Jung, the process of
individuatioo acecmplished that unity, by
linking the singular, conscious self with the
universality of the symbols of the collective
unconscious. '!be symbol of the CCM implies a
similar process in Gandhian thought, but in
Gandhi it also is fused with a social dimendimen
sion.
For as we have just seen, the CCM
symbolically suggests the wholeness p:>8sible
in relationships with others, arrl the vilvil
lage-like ha.rnony which is the p)tential of
human camumi ties.

~ation

Between Authority arrl SUhnission

'!be IlOther-image also fits the dual
roles of the nurse.
Even though Gandhi
viewed his own rrother largely as a pissive
person, the image of the IlOther in his wriwri
tings clearly indicates the power which a
IlOther may hold, if only by re<:.son of our
dependency upon her.
I t is the syrrlrane of
demanding passivity, which often charactercharacter
izes the rrother image of roodern hUllDr:
"why
should you think of me, after all the sacrisacri
fices I've made for you?" '!be rrother has
enorrrous control, even-perhaps especiallyespecially
in her posture of self-effacement arrl sacrisacri
fice. Like the nurse, the IlOther is a mediamedia
tion between authority and sutxaission by
exhibiting
both of those characteristics
si..rrnlltaneously •

'!be other ethical dilemna which is symsym
bolically resolved by the characteristics of
the Gandhian CCM is the tension between auau
thority arrl sutxaission,
freedan arrl rere
straint.
This dilenrna was especially acute
to Gandhi personally, for if we are to accept
his autobiographical account of his childchild
hood, the tension between his father's auau
thoritarian attitooes,
attitu::1es, arrl his rrother's paspas
sivity was a major force in the rrolding of
his own diverse character, and in the wars
which were waged within.
In Gandhi's life history, this tension
was resolved rrost happily in the role of
nurse, a task for which Gandhi volunteered on
several occasions and which he claimed gave
him enorrrous personal satisfaction.
It was
in the role of nurse that Gandhi tended his
father in the tratllllatic IlOlleI1ts during his
father's death. Nursing tasks seduced Gandhi
into participating in two wars, which otherother
wise he likely would not have done.
And
there are many other instances of Gandhi
playing the role of nurse-to members of his
ashram, his family, calves, arrl miscellaneous

animals.

The nursing role is an interesting resaresa
luticn of the tension between authority and
sul:mi.ssion, because it fully E!11bodies both.
'!be nurse is in one sense a servant, sutrnissutrnis
sive arrl humbly waiting upon the every need
of the patient.
No king has been so totally
tended up:m as the patient in the care of an
obedient and watchful nurse.
Arrl yet the
pitient, in his or her weakness, is totally
deperXlent upon the nurse, and in that sense,
the nurse embodies absolute and unlimited
authority.

'!be CCM, for Gandhi, is a symbol both of
the passivity which characterizes the extreme
of the dichotany, and, in different m:>ods,
the CCM is the nurse, the rrother, which rere
solves the duality in a passive power.
The
CCM
is saretimes offered by Gandhi as the
perfect symbol of the sutxaissive spirit 1
"CCM worship means to me worship of innocence.
.the weak and the helpless."[lSl
Yet this
weak and helpless CCM appears, in a renarkrenark
able passage written in 1940, rrore powerful
than our biological rrothers, through the
sheer perfection of her sacrificial service:
Mother CCM is in many ways better
than the rrother who gave us birth.
CUr rrother gives us milk for a
couple of years arrl then expects us
to serve her when we grcM up.
Mo
Mother CCM expects fran us nothing

but grass and grain.
Our llr::lther
often falls ill and expects service
fran us.
l-Dther
z.Dt:her COti rarely falls
ill. Here is an unbroken record of
service which does not end with her
death.
Our IIOther when she dies
means expenses of burial or cremacrema
tion. r-bther CCM is as useful dead
as when she is alive.
we can make
use of every part of her body-her
flesh, her bones, her intestines,
her horns and her skin.
well, I
say this not to disparage the nono
ther who gives us birth, but in
order to show you the substantial
reasons
for my worshipping the
CCM.

Elements of a Humane Ethic
'!be COti symbolism, as employed by GanGan
dhi, therefore has at least three ethical
elements, which may be st1II1llarized as follows:
Wholeness:
the unity of all life, as
expressed in the cxmcept of ahimsa,
which for Gandhi includes the absence of
harmful intent.
Personhood:
the roodiation between the
one and the many which results in the
regard of others as relevant persons.
Concern: the roodiation between authoriauthori
ty and submission, which results in a
passive power, expressed as concern.

[16]

'!bese three ethical elements which are
suggested by Gandhi's imagery of the COti fit
well into Gandhi I S larger ethical structure,
and that structure is daninated by a concept
too sopusticated to be symbolized by a CCM,
the concept of satya, the ha.nocnious good
towards which conflicts are resolved in the
ethical and political process known as satyasatya
graha.
Satyagraha is possible, according to
Gandhi, cnly when the person performing it
(the satyagrahi) regards his or her opponents
with sufficient personhood to be open to the
possibility of discovering truth within them;
and then the satyagrahi IIOVes towards the
truth-......mich is characterized by wholeness-wholeness-
with a concern for the integrity of the opop
ponent.

'Ibis unusual passage was quoted in its
entirety, since it indicates not only the
dual characteristics of the CCM symbol but
also sarething of Gandhi's passionate, alrrost
erotic, expression of it. '!be patently OediOedi
pal overtones, however, simply tm:1erscore the
argument;
ar<J1.I!reIlt; for the classical oedipal pattern
is also a struggle to resolve the submission
to the seductive IIOther and the cx:.mpet.i tion
with the authoritarian father.
'!be CCM is a
displacement of those impulses, but also a
resolution of them; the elements are united
in the sensual power of the CCM who cares, a
sensuality which is accessible through our
worship and devotion, and a power which is
controllable through our caretaking of the
cattle.

'!bus, the three elements symbolized by
the CCM are integrated pieces within the
larger pattern in Gandhi's ethical thought.
Nonetheless, the three CCM elements of wholewhole
ness, personhood, and concern have a certain
integrity by themselves, a rudimentary statestate
ment of basic ethical attitudes.
And alal
though Gandhi did not isolate these three
elements fran the larger context of his ee
thical structure, they are by themselves
helpful in solving a particular problem, the
ethics of human!animal relations.

These aspects of the CCM are perscrlal to
Gandhi, but they are not wholly solipsistic,
for one may argue that the basic approach of
passive resistance is made out of the same
stuff.
That is, passive resistance is both
passive and p::JWerful in its resistance; the
strategic approach is itself, like the CCM, a
roodiation between authority and submission,
the loving rother and the angry father.
'!be
coercive and the persuasive elements of paspas
sive resistance lie uneasily together, as
political observers are quick to point out;
yet few would deny that they are genuinely
intertwined, and the one is not simply, at
least for Gandhi, a ruse to hide the other.
Nor would many deny that the effect of the
dual elements is scmething of a fusion, and
that Gandhi's politics, like his COti, takes a
posture which is both strong and loving,
insistent and caring, a posture of concern.

'!be notion of wholeness provides an
ethical arena, for it implies that the whole
realm of relationships anvng the species, and
within the species, are subjects for rooral
reflection,
and the notion of wholeness
serves as a gauge of holistic harm::ny against
which those relationships may be evaluated.
'!be cxmcepts of personhood and cxmcern are
the iJrlicators of the integrity of those relarela
tionships.
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'!his "CXM ethic" of Ganfu.i is sufficient
to build sound attitudes of humane regard for
the lesser =eatures.
After all, one would
be unlikely to abuse an animal or to treat it
ungenerously, if one regarded that animal as
a perscn with whan one has a relationship of
concern.
Yet, this rather elementary I10ral
attitude is predicated on one's acceptance of
the notion of the wholeness of all life, a
notion which cares easily in the Hindu context, but less easily in the context of the
West, where it is rurrored that only hurrans
have been gifted with souls.

unconscious, the CXI'llatose, and the suicidal,
and the rights of animals.
On the horizon
are the issues of rights to be discussed by
sane future generation: the rights of rocks,
and whether trees have standing. [18]
Perhaps the concept of "animal liberation" might itself be liberated fran the
burden of an ethic based on rights. An ethic
of relationships, with its implications of
responsibility and concord, might be a I10re
useful place to begin.
And for that, we
might I10destly employ Gandhi and his threefold ethic of the CXM.

Animal Rights and Animal Liberation

A Response to the Ethic of Sociobiology
Thus, in Western philosophy and religious thought, there has been an ethical
laCLU1a in the shape of an animal, for there
has never been any clear-headedness about hC1tl
animals should-or could--be ethically regarded.
Western law, secular as well as
I1Oral, has simply exacerbated the problem
with the insistance on the concept of rights
as the principle of legal and ethical behavior.
Rather than our relationship with
animals, it is the nature of animals themselves which is at issue in determining whether they are or are not the sorts of things
which are deserving of fundamental rights.

However, even if Western ethics and
philosophy have been negligent in providing
an understanding about the relationship of
hurrans with other species, Western science
has not.
Indeed, the theological trem:>r
which was felt on the occasion of Darwin was
an indication of the seriousness with which
the biological explanation was taken.
The
theories of evolution contained the elements
of an ethic.
Yet, it has not been until the advent of
sociobiology that the implications of that
ethic have becane obvious.
Human/animal
relationships, although taken seriously, are
no longer of critical issue. In sociobiology
the genetic dispositions to survival traits
are assumed to underlie all attitudes and
activities of humans and other species, including those of their inter-relationships.
At its I10st radical extraoos, sociobiology
justifies, by its ccrnpetitive survival advantages, certain racist and sexist attitudes,
and in that justification lies the evidence
of an ethic, or at least, an anti-ethic.

The animal welfare and anti-vivisection
=usades, which were particularly ardent in
England in the last century, and which have
recently surfaced there again, and in this
country, slip into the same quarrlary when
they insist up:m "animal rights." [17] '!heir
arguments appear to be sadly tautological:
animals are the sorts of things which deserve
to have rights, therefore they should have
rights.
The problem, of course, is that i f
it were so obvious to everyone that animals
should have rights, they would doubtless have
had them.
The "animal rights" people are,
therefore,
not
arguing out of rational
principle but waging a crusade, a =usade for
wider recognition of the rights-worthiness of
lesser species.

'fue starting point of sociobiology and
the starting point of Gandhi are not far
apart, however; both begin with the unviolatable sense of the unity of all life and the
conviction that there are cxmron stanjards
which we should use to gauge all species.
Gandhi and sociobiology part canpany with
their choice of standards.
And yet ~ere is
an area of sociobiology's concern which might
admit sane of Ganfu.i after all;
this is the
paradox that survival may frequently involve
cooperation as well as <XYnpetition.

'!he problem is that rights are assigned
sanewhat arbitrarily and are always subject
tc disagreeroont regarding the boundary between those beings who are worthy of rights
and those who are not. In earlier generations, the issue was over slaves and WCIleIl,
an issue which appears to be finnly settled
in their favor. Today, the issue is over the
rights of the foetus and the newly born, the
BmwEEN 'mE SPOCIES

I t is a Darwinian paradox that

tion,
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in sane cases,

cx:.mpetimay vitiate a species'

survival, and a:x>peration enhance it.
The
lone aggressive ant, by biting the foot of a
boar, may signal his presence and find his
ambitions erased by the scrape of a toe,
whereas the cooperative ant, in ccncert with
persevering thousands, could send that boar
into delirious termination.
The point is
that even by sociobiology's own lindted point
of reference, the quest for survival, there
is an opening for an ethic based on a:x>peration, 1lU.1tuality of trust, and collective
obligations.
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